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Post by Jorji Costava on Nov 8, 2015 13:45:59 GMT -6
1. I find that a very poor and shoddy definition of 'belief'. I don't believe the sky is blue, I KNOW the sky is blue. I KNOW Dallas is a city in Texas. 2. But cultural significance is important, because it makes the middle-ground narrower to the point of non-existence. When the stakes grow higher, the fence grows smaller. For example: Say I'd kidnap an agnostic, I'd put him in a room with 3 doors. Either door A or door B has 1 million bucks behind it and the other has nothing behind it. Door C is the way out. Both door A and door B have their own advocate standing in front of it, trying to convince the agnostic that the money is behind their door, but neither advocate has indefinite proof. Would ANYONE in such a situation refuse to pick either door A or door B, and instead just walk away through door C? Could ANYONE be truly "agonistic" in that situation? 3. That's irrelevant though. In all 3 cases you mentioned, you're by definition an (agnostic-)atheist. 1. Then apparently you know better than pretty much every epistemologist, philosopher of mind and philosopher of religion that has worked on this subject. It's just not true that knowledge entails a lack of belief; in fact just the opposite is true: Knowledge involves having a true belief for which one has good evidence. It used to be thought that this is all knowledge amounted to, until Gettier's 1963 paper demonstrated that this definition is incomplete. Even now, no one thinks that knowledge and belief are mutually exclusive. The source of this common error is the neglect of H.P. Grice's Maxim of Quantity, which says roughly that one ought to make one's utterances as informative as is relevant to the situation. For example, if I write a letter of recommendation for a student in which I talk about nothing but his great handwriting, then that will be taken to imply that the student is not a good researcher. Nothing I said logically entails this, but readers of my letter will generally assume that I'm following the Maxim of Quantity: If it were the case that the student was a good researcher, then I would have said included that information. Since I didn't, he must not be. Things are similar with knowledge and belief: If Bob knows proposition p but I only say "Bob believes proposition p," then what I say is true but violates the Maxim of Quantity. So if I'm following the maxim, I'll always say "Bob knows p" rather than "Bob believes p," even though Bob knowing p does not entail that he does not believe p. 2. First, there is a high degree of controversy about whether or not pragmatic factors having to do with what's in one's interests having anything at all to do with epistemic questions about what's rational for you to believe based on the evidence. But secondly, sometimes high stakes are precisely a reason to be more agnostic than one would otherwise be, especially if one has a great deal to lose by being wrong. Let's say that if you choose A and you're wrong, you lose an arm, while if you choose B and you're wrong, then you lose a leg. Probably, most would choose door C. 3. Again, this is just not how these terms are used by anyone who studies the philosophy of religion. You want different terms to encompass those categories, and "atheist=believes God does not exist," "agonistc=withholds belief regarding the existence of God" is the most natural and common way of doing this.
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